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Avoiding the Abyss

Iran’s “constrained” cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency

16 يونيو، 2023


The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said in a confidential report on May 31, 2023, that it closed its investigation of traces of enriched uranium at the Marivan (Abadeh), near the city of Shiraz in southeast of Tehran, after receiving “a possible explanation” from Iran. The agency also installed enrichment monitoring devices at Fordo and Natanz to track Iran's nuclear program, as part of the deal signed in 2015. 

Motives for Retreat

Two factors contributed to Iran's willingness to compromise on pending matters with the International Atomic Energy Agency. These can be explained as follows: 

1- Advancing nuclear negotiation efforts: 

Through these concessions, Tehran seeks to pave the way for the revival of nuclear negotiations with Washington and European partners, at a standstill since September 2022. The announcement coincided with Western reports on a meeting between US Special Envoy to Iran Robert Malley and the Permanent Representative of Iran to the United Nations Saeid Iravani recently. This marks the first direct meeting between the two parties since the US withdrew from the nuclear deal in 2018. 

While the focus of the conference revolved around the prospects of a prisoner swap agreement between the two parties, the success of these negotiations could potentially serve as a catalyst for the resumption of nuclear talks. This coincides with reports of Western parties resuming discussions on implementing a diplomatic strategy to address Iran's nuclear escalation. The timing is crucial, particularly as European parties express concerns about potential delays from Washington in addressing this issue until after the 2024 presidential elections. 

This comes at a time when Oman's Sultan Haitham bin Tariq al-Said visited Iran on May 28, 2023 and met with the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and President Ebrahim Raisi. This visit is part of Muscat's efforts to mediate a resolution to the nuclear negotiations deadlock.

According to certain Western reports, US President Joe Biden’s top White House adviser Brett McGurk made a quiet stop to Oman earlier in May 2023 to meet with Omani officials. Talks explored potential diplomatic dialogue with Iran concerning its nuclear program as well as understanding Iran's willingness to impose certain constraints on the program, easing regional tensions all while identifying their desired reciprocation. This is a clear sign of Washington's efforts to revive a partial agreement with Iran on its nuclear program, rather than pursing a comprehensive deal. 

2- Avoid condemning Iran: 

Tehran pre-empted the June 2023 meeting of the IAEA’s Board of Governors with a partial settlement of one of the major outstanding issues. This is particularly related to explaining the traces of enriched uranium found in three undeclared sites in southern Tehran, mainly Marivan, Varamin, and Turquzabad. Only for the Marivan site did Iran propose an explanation for these traces.

Iran has also reinstalled monitoring equipment at an Isfahan site where it manufactures centrifuge parts, and at Fordo and Natanz, where uranium enrichment operations are carried out.

These actions are part of Iran's implementation of its responsibilities, which it agreed to during the IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi’s visit to Iran in March 2023, in collaboration with the Agency. This is due to concerns that its inability to cooperate with the Agency may result in the decision to bring the Iran case to the Security Council, hence the reinstatement of international sanctions imposed before to the signing of the 2015 deal.

A Parallel Escalation

Despite Tehran's initial response to the IAEA regarding some problematic files, the country's nuclear activities have continued to progress. This can be explained as follows: 

1. An incomplete Iranian cooperation: 

On June 5, 2023, the IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi, stated that collaboration between Iran and the Agency has been limited, and that Iran's nuclear program is still progressing at a rapid and concerning pace. Grossi also confirmed, in his opening speech to the Agency on the same day, that Iran provided a possible explanation for the traces of enriched uranium in one of the three secret nuclear sites investigated by the agency in 2018, with the investigation still ongoing. This in reference to Tehran's inability to provide explanations for the other two sites.

The agency confirmed that Iran's estimated stockpile of enriched uranium had reached more than 23 times the limit set out in the 2015 accord. Iran has also increased its stockpile of 60% enriched uranium to 141.1 kilograms since February 2023. Experts estimate that Iran’s stockpile is sufficient to produce three nuclear bombs if enriched to 90%, which could happen within a month. 

The agency further stated that Iran is still delaying the installation of additional surveillance equipment that was agreed upon months ago and refusing to pass over surveillance camera recordings. Iran has made it clear that it will only comply with this demand if a nuclear agreement is reached that necessitates the lifting of sanctions. Tehran has even gone as far as issuing threats to delete these recordings should the sanctions remain in place. 

On May 22, 2023, Western reports revealed that Tehran is building a nuclear facility so deep in the earth in the Zagros Mountains in central Iran. Experts say the country would likely be able to use the underground facility to enrich uranium and build centrifuges. This highlights Tehran's willingness to continue nuclear escalation, despite its minimal concessions to the IAEA. 

2. Increasing military escalation between the two sides: 

Iran has recently increased its threats to navigation in the Strait of Hormuz by hounding ships passing through it. This comes after two ships were detained under false pretenses. In addition, three fast-attack Guard vessels approached a third merchant ship on June 3, 2023. The US Navy's guided-missile destroyer USS McFaul and the Royal Navy's frigate HMS Lancaster responded to the incident, prompting the Iranian vessels to withdraw.

US sources have also revealed that Iran is training and equipping fighters in Syria, with the intention of initiating a fresh wave of operations against US forces. These fighters are being armed with specifically designed high-powered explosives, aimed at inflicting greater casualties on US troops. Such actions demonstrate Iran’s persistent escalation strategy.

3. Sanctions on Iran: 

In early June 2023, the US Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) imposed sanctions on members of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). These include two senior officials of the IRGC’s Intelligence Organization, and a company affiliated to the Quds Force who have been involved in a series of terrorist plots including assassination plots targeting former United States government officials, dual US and Iranian nationals, and Iranian dissidents.

Sanctions were also imposed on the Iran-based technology company known as “Arvan Cloud,” two senior employees of the company, and an affiliated company based in the region for their roles in facilitating the Iranian regime’s censorship of the Internet in Iran. This was part of the Iranian government's efforts to quell the protests that started in mid-September 2022.

This indicates that, despite Washington's commitment to diplomacy in dealing and communicating with Iran, whether directly or through intermediaries, it will continue to use pressure Iran through sanctions in order to halt hostile operations, particularly terrorist ones, against the US and its allies.

Iran’s recent concessions to the IAEA are merely part of its ongoing brinkmanship policy. This approach involves a pattern of nuclear escalation followed by limited concessions to avoid going to the point of no return. That is activating the UN’s automatic sanctions and snapback mechanism, following the IAEA’s resolution to the council citing Iran's violation of the 2015 nuclear agreement.